Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
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Publication:2673159
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105447zbMATH Open1492.91124OpenAlexW4221096569MaRDI QIDQ2673159FDOQ2673159
Christian Stricker, Christian Saile, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 9 June 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105447
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Cited In (11)
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- A note on the manipulation of social choice correspondence
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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