Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
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- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
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- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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Cited in
(15)- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- A note on the manipulation of social choice correspondence
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
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