Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives

DOI10.1007/S003550050020zbMATH Open1069.91559OpenAlexW2008748228MaRDI QIDQ2388752FDOQ2388752

Authors: Jean-François Laslier 

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (14)

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