New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.12.003zbMATH Open1246.91041DBLPjournals/mss/ChevaleyreLMMX12arXiv1111.3690OpenAlexW2109871085WikidataQ62043031 ScholiaQ62043031MaRDI QIDQ449052FDOQ449052

Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Jérôme Monnot, Lirong Xia, Yann Chevaleyre

Publication date: 11 September 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number $k$ of new candidates will be added. We give a computational study of this problem, focusing on scoring rules, and we provide a formal comparison with related problems such as control via adding candidates or cloning.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3690

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zbMATH Keywords

votingscoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (15)

• On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
• Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
• Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
• The complexity of priced control in elections
• The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
• Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
• On the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard
• Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks
• The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
• The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections

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