New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.003zbMath1246.91041arXiv1111.3690OpenAlexW2109871085WikidataQ62043031 ScholiaQ62043031MaRDI QIDQ449052

Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Jérôme Monnot, Lirong Xia, Yann Chevaleyre

Publication date: 11 September 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3690

zbMATH Keywords

votingscoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (15)

The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections ⋮ The complexity of priced control in elections ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections ⋮ Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ The possible winner with uncertain weights problem ⋮ Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model ⋮ On the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules ⋮ Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks ⋮ Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting ⋮ The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections ⋮ On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard

Cites Work

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• Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
• Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Swap Bribery
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

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