On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
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Publication:5111273
DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.57zbMath1447.91053arXiv1610.08407OpenAlexW2964079196MaRDI QIDQ5111273
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.08407
Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (6)
Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences ⋮ On the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard ⋮ Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers ⋮ On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
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- On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
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