Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
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Publication:898672
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.008zbMath1368.91074OpenAlexW1484124139MaRDI QIDQ898672
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01702492/file/consistency%20revised.pdf
Related Items (5)
On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints
Cites Work
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- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
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- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
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- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- On probability models in voting theory
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