Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
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Publication:898672
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.08.008zbMATH Open1368.91074OpenAlexW1484124139MaRDI QIDQ898672FDOQ898672
Authors: Eric Kamwa, Vincent Merlin 
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01702492/file/consistency%20revised.pdf
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Cites Work
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- The Borda dictionary
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- On probability models in voting theory
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
- Optimal pairs of score vectors for positional scoring rules
- New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
Cited In (11)
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
- Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: Indirect scoring procedures
- Score-Based vs. Probability-Based Enumeration – A Cautionary Note
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
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