Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:898672
Recommendations
- Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Contrasting probabilistic scoring rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4024497
- Proper scoring rules for general decision models
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
Cites work
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
- On probability models in voting theory
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Optimal pairs of score vectors for positional scoring rules
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- The Borda dictionary
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
Cited in
(11)- Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
- Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: Indirect scoring procedures
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Score-Based vs. Probability-Based Enumeration – A Cautionary Note
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
This page was built for publication: Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q898672)
