Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1162266
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90041-5zbMath0479.90014MaRDI QIDQ1162266
William V. Gehrlein, Peter C. Fishburn
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90041-5
transitivity; plurality rule; Borda rule; Condorcet winner; scoring rule; arbitrary preferences; Condorcet candidate; elections among three candidates; large electorates; majority agreements; normal orthant probability; rule-lambda ranking
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Cites Work