The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6MaRDI QIDQ1235632zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein, Peter Fishburn

Publication date 1976

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical economics (91B99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3305564 (Why is no real title available?)
• ON THE MOMENTS OF ORDER STATISTICS IN SAMPLES FROM NORMAL POPULATIONS
• The cyclical majority problem
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

Cited in

(30)

• Condorcet's paradox
• Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
• A recursion relation for the probability of the paradox of voting
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate
• The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey
• The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
• Transitivity revisited
• A general concept of majority rule
• An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
• The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
• Investigating the probability of a voting cycle when the electorate is large
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
• Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
• Combinatorics of Election Scores
• Fair in the Eyes of Others
• Counting condorcet
• Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
• Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
• Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
• The expected likelihood of transitivity for a probabilistic chooser

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