An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters
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Publication:2127897
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.01.002zbMath1489.91097arXiv2009.02979OpenAlexW4220745589MaRDI QIDQ2127897
Publication date: 21 April 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.02979
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