The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution

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Publication:1235632

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6zbMath0351.90002OpenAlexW2030710501MaRDI QIDQ1235632

Peter C. Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6



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