Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
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Publication:5053696
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12zbMath1504.91091OpenAlexW2964287053MaRDI QIDQ5053696
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12
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