scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450033
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Publication:5018516
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
Publication date: 20 December 2021
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.09110
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Related Items (3)
An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters ⋮ Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover ⋮ Unnamed Item
Cites Work
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