Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.05.003zbMATH Open1461.91124arXiv1804.04047OpenAlexW3035703578MaRDI QIDQ2019331FDOQ2019331

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 26 April 2021

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04047

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zbMATH Keywords

Paretostabilitymonotonicitybalancednesstops-in

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A stability property in social choice theory
• Balancedness of social choice correspondences

Cited In (3)

• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

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