Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
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Cites work
- Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Non-cooperative games
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- Stability in Voting
- Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
Cited in
(8)- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
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