On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

Cited in

(28)

Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
Social compromise and social metrics
The capacity of a committee
A theory of coalition formation in committees
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
Properties of consistent voting systems
The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
Representations of simple games by social choice functions
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
On strongly consistent social choice functions
A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Implementability via protective equilibria
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

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