Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
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Cites work
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Equally distributed correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- Properties of consistent voting systems
- Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The capacity of a committee
- The Marriage Problem
- The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
Cited in
(5)- A universal voting system based on the potential method
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
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