Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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Cites work
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The Proportional Veto Principle
- The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
Cited in
(94)- Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Minimal and locally minimal games and game forms
- Interaction sheaves on continuous domains
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives
- Stability of topological effectivity functions
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
- Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
- A note of tight extensive game forms
- Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
- Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class
- Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs
- Decomposable effectivity functions
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Strongly consistent two-player game forms
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Effectivity functions and simple games
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Vetoing in social choice with blockings
- On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.
- Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
- Effectivity and power
- Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
- Implementation via rights structures
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- The consistency principle for games in strategic form
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics
- Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
- Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- On effectivity functions of game forms
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- War and peace in veto voting
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- ``How characteristic are characteristic functions?
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- An existence theorem of Nash equilibrium in Coq and Isabelle
- Game Quantification Patterns
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING
- Deontic logic for strategic games
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
- Social Choice Theory
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- GAME FORMATS AS CHU SPACES
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
- The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
- The reciprocity set
- Seven kinds of equivalent models for generalized coalition logics
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
- Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
- A logical study of moral responsibility
- Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index
- Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
- A local theory of cooperative games
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Equivalent game forms and coalitional power
- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- Binary effectivity rules
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Comparative cooperative game theory
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
- Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties
- Decomposing complete edge-chromatic graphs and hypergraphs. Revisited
- A stability index for local effectivity functions
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