The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0574-XMaRDI QIDQ649144zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ben McQuillin, Robert Sugden

Publication date 30 November 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://github.com/ueaeco/working-papers/raw/master/papers/cbess/UEA-CBESS-09-15.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history

Cited in

(6)

• Implementation via rights structures
• Rights as alternative game forms
• Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view

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