Stability of topological effectivity functions
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Stability of effectivity functions on a topological space of alternatives is considered. Previous results proved by two authors are related to each other. Special attention is brought to the notions of cycle, upper and lower cycle. Examples of EFs with an infinite alternative space in social choice and economic theory are provided. Finally we prove by a direct method that the core of a convex topological EF is nonempty for any continuous preference relation.
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Cites work
- A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4061024 (Why is no real title available?)
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
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