scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4061024

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Publication:3795508





An effectivity function E assigns to every coalition a family of subsets of the set of alternatives so that the coalition can force an outcome to belong to any of these subsets. For any assignment of utility functions to the players, E defines a cooperative game without side payments called an implementation of E. E is said to be stable if all implementations have nonempty core. The author [Int. J. Game Theory 14, 93-101 (1985; Zbl 0567.90101)] previously characterized stable effectivity functions for finite sets of alternatives. This paper extends these results to infinite sets of alternatives. The main results are: (1) E is stable if and only if there are no cycles in E (see the paper for a precise definition of ``no cycle); and (2) every cooperative game without side payments satisfying a monotonicity condition is the implementation of some effectivity function.











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