Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4061024
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- ON THE EQUIVALENCY OF BALANCEDNESS AND STABILITY IN EFFECTIVITY FUNCTION GAMES
- Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives
- Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
Cites work
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- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Dual cores and effectivity functions
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- Kernels in perfect line-graphs
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture
- On kernels in perfect graphs
- Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs
- The Core of an N Person Game
Cited in
(14)- Minimal and locally minimal games and game forms
- Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
- On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.
- Dual-bounded generating problems: Weighted transversals of a hypergraph
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- On effectivity functions of game forms
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
- Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
- Stability of two player game structures
- A stability index for local effectivity functions
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