Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.005MaRDI QIDQ5898285zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling

Publication date 7 December 2006

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0411028

zbMATH Keywords

3GSMbalanced gamecyclic preferenceseffectivity functionstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We consider stable three-dimensional matchings of three categories of agents, such as women, men and dogs. This was suggested long ago by Knuth (1976), but very little seems to have been published on this problem. Based on computer experiments, we present a couple of conjectures as well as a few counter-examples to other natural but discarded conjectures. In particular, a circular 3D matching is one where women only care about the man, men only care about the dog, and dogs only care about the woman they are matched with. We conjecture that a stable outcome always exists for any circular 3D matching market, and we prove it for markets with at most four agents of each category.

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Cited in

(24)

• Three-dimensional matching instances are rich in stable matchings
• Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
• Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
• Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
• Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
• Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
• Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
• Matching with ownership
• A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• On random stable matchings: cyclic ones with strict preferences and two-sided ones with partially ordered preferences
• Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
• Counterexamples of small size for three-sided stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
• A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Stable marriage with general preferences
• Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Hardness results for stable exchange problems
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• Minimal instances with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with cyclic incomplete preferences
• On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
• Multi-dimensional stable roommates in 2-dimensional Euclidean space
• Geometric stable roommates

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