On effectivity functions of game forms
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4133765 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5852793 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862972 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4095249 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3726121 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3545568 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 497456 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties
- Bottleneck extrema
- Combinatorial characterization of read-once formulae
- Complex analysis and convolution operators
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
- Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- Stability of two player game structures
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives
- The solvability of positional games in pure strategies
- War and peace in veto voting
Cited in
(19)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4133765 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 497456 (Why is no real title available?)
- Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
- Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
- Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms
- On acyclicity of games with cycles
- Consistent rights on property spaces
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
- On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- A note of tight extensive game forms
- Complex analysis and convolution operators
- Sandwich problem for \(\varPi\)- and \(\varDelta\)-free multigraphs and its applications to positional games
- Decomposing complete edge-chromatic graphs and hypergraphs. Revisited
- Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms
- Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games
This page was built for publication: On effectivity functions of game forms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2268107)
