Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function

DOI10.1007/BF01240054MaRDI QIDQ687989zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masayoshi Mizutani, Yasuhiko Hiraide, Hisakazu Nishino

Publication date 31 August 1994

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240054

zbMATH Keywords

effectivity functionpreference order of each playerScarf balancednesssocial choicestrong cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4061024
• Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• ON THE EQUIVALENCY OF BALANCEDNESS AND STABILITY IN EFFECTIVITY FUNCTION GAMES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538853

Cites work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• The Core of an N Person Game

Cited in

(6)

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium

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