Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function

DOI10.1007/BF01240054MaRDI QIDQ687989zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masayoshi Mizutani, Yasuhiko Hiraide, Hisakazu Nishino

Publication date 31 August 1994

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240054

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceeffectivity functionstrong cyclepreference order of each playerScarf balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60)

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Cites work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• The Core of an N Person Game

Cited in

(5)

• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING
• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium

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