Nonmanipulable Cores

DOI10.2307/1911261MaRDI QIDQ3773731zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange

Publication date 1987

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911261

zbMATH Keywords

blocking power of coalitionscoreeffectivity functionexchange economynonmanipulable correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(21)

• The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
• Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
• Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
• Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Moral hazard and stability
• ``How characteristic are characteristic functions?
• Non—embeddable o—rings
• The hypercore on social choice problem
• FSTTCS 2005: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
• On strongly consistent social choice functions
• Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
• Core is manipulable via segmentation
• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires

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