The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good

DOI10.1007/BF01213665MaRDI QIDQ1814944zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benny Moldovanu

Publication date 3 November 1996

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationnegotiationpublic goodstationary strategiessubgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
• The equivalence of the cost share equilibria and the core of a voting game in a public goods economy

Cites work

• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
• How to share the cost of a public good
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• Order independent equilibria
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Cited in

(3)

• Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities

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