Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
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Publication:1195595
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90037-SzbMath0770.90089OpenAlexW2111875179MaRDI QIDQ1195595
Publication date: 12 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90037-s
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Cites Work
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Bargaining conventions
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Bargaining in cooperative games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- The Core of an N Person Game
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