Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
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Publication:1195595
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Cites work
- Bargaining conventions
- Bargaining in cooperative games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3775297 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784577 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- The Core of an N Person Game
Cited in
(13)- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Odd man out: The proposal-making model
- Successful Nash equilibrium agent for a three-player imperfect-information game
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products
- Sion's minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric three-players zero-sum game
- NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads
- ONE-SELLER/TWO-BUYER MARKETS WITH BUYER EXTERNALITIES AND (IM)PERFECT COMPETITION
- Pool formation with three patent owners
- Equilibrium coalition structures in three-player symmetric games
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