Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
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Publication:751520
DOI10.1007/BF01761075zbMATH Open0714.90105OpenAlexW2106622020MaRDI QIDQ751520FDOQ751520
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761075
stability propertiespre-kernelassignment gamesstable solutioncore-kernel intersectiongames without side paymentsnontransferrable utility
Cites Work
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- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
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- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments
- A note on a theorem of Aumann and Drèze
Cited In (7)
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games
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