Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90144-3zbMATH Open0554.90103OpenAlexW2038927822MaRDI QIDQ760345FDOQ760345

Authors: Sharon C. Rochford 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90144-3

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• Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
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• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets

zbMATH Keywords

kernelbargainingcoreoptimal assignmentassignment gamesymmetrically pairwise- bargained (SPB) allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market

Cited In (36)

• Exchange networks with stochastic matching
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• On the existence of fair matching algorithms
• Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
• Households, markets and public choice
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• On the stability of couples
• (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
• The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
• An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
• Non-cooperative matching games
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
• Bargaining cum voice
• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Groups, collective decisions and markets
• Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
• Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
• A survey on assignment markets
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
• Matching markets and cultural selection
• Bargaining property of nucleolus and \(\tau\)-value in a class of TU-games
• A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
• On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets

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