Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
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Publication:760345
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3771380 (Why is no real title available?)
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The assignment game. I: The core
Cited in
(36)- Bargaining property of nucleolus and \(\tau\)-value in a class of TU-games
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
- Exchange networks with stochastic matching
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
- Bargaining cum voice
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- A survey on assignment markets
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
- A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
- From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
- Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784407 (Why is no real title available?)
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- On the existence of fair matching algorithms
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Matching markets and cultural selection
- Non-cooperative matching games
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games
- Multilateral bargaining problems
- An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- Households, markets and public choice
- Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
- Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
- Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
- On the stability of couples
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