Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market

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Publication:760345

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90144-3zbMath0554.90103OpenAlexW2038927822MaRDI QIDQ760345

Sharon C. Rochford

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90144-3




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