Matching markets and cultural selection

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00249-4MaRDI QIDQ2070745zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jia-Bin Wu

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcultural selectionevolutionary game theorymatching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Cites work

• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
• Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability
• How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
• Problem solving by heterogeneous agents
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

Cited in

(3)

• Decentralized matching and social segregation
• Late marriage and transition from arranged marriages to love matches: a search-theoretic approach
• Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution

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