Matching markets and cultural selection

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4zbMath1482.91149OpenAlexW3141292882MaRDI QIDQ2070745

Jia-Bin Wu

Publication date: 24 January 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00249-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingevolutionary game theorymatching marketscultural selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Problem solving by heterogeneous agents
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

This page was built for publication: Matching markets and cultural selection