The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.039zbMath1410.91076OpenAlexW2101311496WikidataQ50674562 ScholiaQ50674562MaRDI QIDQ1732931

Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Fernando Vega-Redondo

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.039

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsprisoner's dilemmaconditional associationexit optionpositive assortment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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