Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long
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Publication:1656963
DOI10.3390/g8030035zbMath1410.91086arXiv1708.05705OpenAlexW3104505782MaRDI QIDQ1656963
Marco Antonio Amaral, Lucas Wardil
Publication date: 13 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05705
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Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection, Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment
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