Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
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Publication:2186560
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020zbMath1447.92561OpenAlexW1977102456WikidataQ80591243 ScholiaQ80591243MaRDI QIDQ2186560
Publication date: 9 June 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020
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