The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:1999485
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2019.03.004zbMath1415.92210OpenAlexW2933693093WikidataQ92849808 ScholiaQ92849808MaRDI QIDQ1999485
Publication date: 27 June 2019
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2019.03.004
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Cites Work
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- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
- THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
- Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
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