Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games
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Cites work
Cited in
(25)- Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
- Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
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- Adult sex ratio as an index for male strategy in primates
- The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
- The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state
- Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
- The asymmetric hawk-dove game with costs measured as time lost
- Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent?
- When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: a model of kleptoparasitism
- Reducing courtship time promotes marital bliss: the battle of the sexes game revisited with costs measured as time lost
- The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
- Revisiting the ``fallacy of averages in ecology: expected gain per unit time equals expected gain divided by expected time
- A temporal model of territorial defence with antagonistic interactions
- Age structure, replicator equation, and the prisoner's dilemma
- Evolution of aggression in consumer-resource models
- Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
- Replicator dynamics generalized for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints
- From confinement to remodeling: modeling topotaxis-driven cell migration in obstacles networks
- Dynamically unstable ESS in matrix games under time constraints
- Two timescales in stochastic evolutionary games
- Strong stability for matrix games under time constraints
- Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs
- Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays
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