Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.01.010MaRDI QIDQ2013446zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ross Cressman, Vlastimil Křivan

Publication date 18 August 2017

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://zenodo.org/record/3303008

zbMATH Keywords

population dynamicsprisoner's dilemmaevolutionary game theoryhawk-dove gamepair formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
• Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: the owner-intruder game
• Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs
• Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints
• The asymmetric hawk-dove game with costs measured as time lost

Cites work

• Active linking in evolutionary games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
• Optimal foraging and predator-prey dynamics
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(21)

• Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
• Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs
• Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays
• A temporal model of territorial defence with antagonistic interactions
• The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Age structure, replicator equation, and the prisoner's dilemma
• Beyond replicator dynamics: from frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games
• Bimatrix games that include interaction times alter the evolutionary outcome: the owner-intruder game
• Adult sex ratio as an index for male strategy in primates
• The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
• Revisiting the ``fallacy of averages in ecology: expected gain per unit time equals expected gain divided by expected time
• Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent?
• Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state
• The asymmetric hawk-dove game with costs measured as time lost
• When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: a model of kleptoparasitism
• The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
• Reducing courtship time promotes marital bliss: the battle of the sexes game revisited with costs measured as time lost
• Replicator dynamics generalized for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints
• Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
• Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
• Evolution of aggression in consumer-resource models

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