Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.010zbMath1368.91032OpenAlexW2568790894WikidataQ47355414 ScholiaQ47355414MaRDI QIDQ2013446

Ross Cressman, Vlastimil Křivan

Publication date: 18 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://zenodo.org/record/3303008

zbMATH Keywords

population dynamicsevolutionary game theoryprisoner's dilemmahawk-dove gamepair formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (19)

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Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Optimal foraging and predator-prey dynamics
• Active linking in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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