The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics

DOI10.1007/S00285-019-01440-6MaRDI QIDQ2299264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 21 February 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://zenodo.org/record/3525895

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitymatrix gamemonomorphicpolymorphicpopulation gamereplicator dynamicstime constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(12)

• The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
• Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints
• Replicator dynamics for the game theoretic selection models based on state
• When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: a model of kleptoparasitism
• Kleptoparasitic interactions modeling varying owner and intruder hunger awareness
• Owner–Intruder contests with correlated resource values
• Owner-intruder contests with information asymmetry
• Stability and stabilization of evolutionary games with time delays via matrix method
• Coevolutionary stability of host-symbiont systems with mixed-mode transmission
• Replicator dynamics generalized for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints
• Dynamically unstable ESS in matrix games under time constraints
• Strong stability for matrix games under time constraints

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