The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics
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Publication:2299264
DOI10.1007/s00285-019-01440-6zbMath1435.91030OpenAlexW2987369650WikidataQ91330783 ScholiaQ91330783MaRDI QIDQ2299264
Publication date: 21 February 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://zenodo.org/record/3525895
evolutionary stabilityreplicator dynamicstime constraintmatrix gamepopulation gamepolymorphicmonomorphic
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