Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00539.XMaRDI QIDQ3406027zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

Publication date 12 February 2010

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00539.x

zbMATH Keywords

distributionstabilityprisoner's dilemmastrategymatching gameplayers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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• Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters
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• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
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• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
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• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
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• Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency

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