Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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Publication:3406027
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00539.XzbMATH Open1185.91052OpenAlexW2153678285MaRDI QIDQ3406027FDOQ3406027
Authors: Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
Publication date: 12 February 2010
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00539.x
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