Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00539.XzbMath1185.91052OpenAlexW2153678285MaRDI QIDQ3406027

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Publication date: 12 February 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00539.x

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitydistributionstrategymatching gameprisoner's dilemmaplayers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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