Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
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Publication:2662533
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125678OpenAlexW3097995489MaRDI QIDQ2662533
Publication date: 14 April 2021
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125678
cooperationevolutionary game theoryPrisoner's dilemma gameevolutionary ecologyexit optionpartner refusal
Related Items (3)
Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Fixation probabilities of strategies for trimatrix games and their applications to triadic conflict ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
Cites Work
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