Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110678zbMath1465.91015OpenAlexW3137350011MaRDI QIDQ2029549

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 3 June 2021

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110678

zbMATH Keywords

public goodscooperationevolutionary game theory\(n\)-player gameinternal equilibriacommon goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Social relationship adjustments within the same sex promote marital bliss ⋮ Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network ⋮ The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution

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