Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2096352
Recommendations
- Heterogeneous aspiration resolves social dilemma in structured populations
- Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks
- Expectation driven by update willingness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs
- Aspiration-induced dormancy promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Cites work
- Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
- Does mobility decrease cooperation?
- Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
- Empty nodes affect conditional cooperation under reinforcement learning
- Evolving cooperation
- Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation
- Reputation-based adaptive adjustment of link weight among individuals promotes the cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
- Role of memory effect in the evolution of cooperation based on spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Cited in
(6)- Heterogeneous aspiration resolves social dilemma in structured populations
- Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma
- Evolutionary cooperation dynamics of combining imitation and super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating
- Impact of different social attitudes on epidemic spreading in activity-driven networks
This page was built for publication: Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2096352)