Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2023.128226arXiv2307.02832OpenAlexW4383497588MaRDI QIDQ6096358

Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki

Publication date: 12 September 2023

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02832

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationsocial dilemmasmyopic strategy update

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

Cites Work

• Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games
• Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment
• Mercenary punishment in structured populations
• Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network
• The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution
• Pool-rewarding in \(N\)-person snowdrift game
• Interaction stochasticity may hinder cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Influencer propagation model promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
• Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
• Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity

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