Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
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Publication:2013676
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002zbMath1368.92146OpenAlexW2560822824WikidataQ53638090 ScholiaQ53638090MaRDI QIDQ2013676
Publication date: 9 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? ⋮ The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Persistence extends reciprocity ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
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