Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
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Publication:2013676
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148873 (Why is no real title available?)
- Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
- Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
- Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
- Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
- Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
- Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
- Positive interactions promote public cooperation
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies
- Strategy selection in structured populations
- The evolution of cooperation
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
Cited in
(13)- Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Group extinction in iterated two person games with evolved group-level mixed strategies
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
- Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner's dilemmas with agents' exponential lifespan
- Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
- Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
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