Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
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Publication:2500403
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission
- Models for cultural inheritance. I: Group mean and within group variation
- The evolution of continuous variation. II: Complex transmission and assortative mating
- The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
- The logic of animal conflict
Cited in
(15)- Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
- Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?
- Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
- A game theory explanation for menstrual synchrony: the harem paradox
- New categories of conditional contribution strategies in the public goods game
- Many-strategy games in groups with relatives and the evolution of coordinated cooperation
- Frames and games: intensionality and equilibrium selection
- Memory-based evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with neighbor screening mechanism
- Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
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