Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2005.09.005zbMATH Open1117.92046OpenAlexW1985604307WikidataQ34491501 ScholiaQ34491501MaRDI QIDQ2500403FDOQ2500403
Peter Hammerstein, Edward H. Hagen
Publication date: 23 August 2006
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005
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Cites Work
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- The evolution of continuous variation. II: Complex transmission and assortative mating
- The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission
- Models for cultural inheritance. I: Group mean and within group variation
Cited In (8)
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
- Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
- Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
- Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
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