Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
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Publication:2324874
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.07.012zbMath1420.91016OpenAlexW2963000284WikidataQ92204542 ScholiaQ92204542MaRDI QIDQ2324874
Publication date: 12 September 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.07.012
Problems related to evolution (92D15) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (5)
Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Social relationship adjustments within the same sex promote marital bliss ⋮ Fixation probabilities of strategies for trimatrix games and their applications to triadic conflict ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
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