Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.mbs.2016.03.011zbMath1341.92049OpenAlexW2314341646WikidataQ47442254 ScholiaQ47442254MaRDI QIDQ299395

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 22 June 2016

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2016.03.011

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityimperfect informationprisoner's dilemmamistakespayoff linearitysynergetic effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity ⋮ Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators ⋮ The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Persistence extends reciprocity ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient? ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?

Cites Work

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• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Limitations of inclusive fitness
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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