The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1007/BF00049570zbMATH Open0722.90092OpenAlexW2035266053MaRDI QIDQ757265FDOQ757265

Authors: Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Acta Applicandae Mathematicae (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00049570

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zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainreactive strategiesPrisoner's DilemmaMarkov gameadaptive dynamicstochastic strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamical systems and ergodic theory (37-XX)

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Cited In (74)

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• Advanced defensive cooperators promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• A \(2\times 2\) \(\varepsilon\)-best response stochastic two-step game
• THE EFFECT OF PINNING CONTROL ON EVOLUTIONARY PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
• Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game
• Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria
• Distinguishing punishing costly signals from nonpunishing costly signals can facilitate the emergence of altruistic punishment
• New delay-dependent observer-based control for uncertain stochastic time-delay systems
• Simulating Grice. Emergent pragmatics in spatialized game theory
• Dynamics of signaling games
• Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
• The influence of demographic stochasticity on evolutionary dynamics and stability
• Preference and evolution in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Dynamic model of market of patents and equilibria in technology stocks.
• Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games
• Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
• Essential conditions for evolution of communication within a species
• Does synergy rescue the evolution of cooperation? An analysis for homogeneous populations with non-overlapping generations
• Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium
• Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle
• Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
• Autocratic strategies for alternating games
• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
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• Two-person second-order games. I: Formulation and transition anatomy
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• Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game
• Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration
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• Evolutionary potential games on lattices
• Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
• Harsh environments: multi-player cooperation with excludability and congestion
• Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

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