Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.07.026MaRDI QIDQ1705282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Seung Ki Baek, Su Do Yi, Hyeong-Chai Jeong

Publication date 15 March 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.10243

zbMATH Keywords

mutationevolution of cooperationiterated prisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the emergence of cooperation. In the evolutionary context, the iterated prisoner's dilemma is often combined with population dynamics, in which a more successful strategy replicates itself with a higher growth rate. Here, we investigate the replicator dynamics of three representative strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and tit-for-tat, which prescribes reciprocal cooperation by mimicking the opponent's previous move. Our finding is that the dynamics is self-dual in the sense that it remains invariant when we apply time reversal and exchange the fractions of unconditional cooperators and defectors in the population. The duality implies that the fractions can be equalized by tit-for-tat players, although unconditional cooperation is still dominated by defection. Furthermore, we find that mutation among the strategies breaks the exact duality in such a way that cooperation is more favored than defection, as long as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is small.

Recommendations

• Invasion dynamics of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
• Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma

Cites work

• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Limit cycles sparked by mutation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Optional games on cycles and complete graphs
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

Cited in

(6)

• Effects of quasi-defection strategy on cooperation evolution in social dilemma
• Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
• Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated hawk-dove game
• How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
• Advanced defensive cooperators promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

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