Optional games on cycles and complete graphs
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Publication:2415562
Abstract: We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas. Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games. We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increasing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial structure.
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Cited in
(10)- Games without repetitions on graphs with vertex disjoint cycles
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