Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies

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Publication:1783680

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.05.031zbMATH Open1397.91064arXiv1106.4049OpenAlexW2067037624WikidataQ50625721 ScholiaQ50625721MaRDI QIDQ1783680FDOQ1783680


Authors: Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Arne Traulsen Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several parties determines evolutionary success. Rather than pair-wise interactions, in this case we must take into account the interactions between many players, which are inherently more complicated than the usual two-player games, but can still yield simple results. In this manuscript we derive the composition of a many-player multiple strategy system in the mutation-selection equilibrium. This results in a simple expression which can be obtained by recursions using coalescence theory. This approach can be modified to suit a variety of contexts, e.g. to find the equilibrium frequencies of a finite number of alleles in a polymorphism or that of different strategies in a social dilemma in a cultural context.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.4049




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