General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2013.03.004MaRDI QIDQ1672996zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takuya Sekiguchi

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2013.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationmutation-selection balancestochastic evolutionary game dynamicsupdating rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games
• Enhanced cooperation in prisoner's dilemma with aspiration
• Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
• Evolutionary games on star graphs under various updating rules
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
• Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher

Cited in

(6)

• Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
• Abundance of strategies for trimatrix games in finite populations
• Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
• Fixation probabilities of strategies for trimatrix games and their applications to triadic conflict
• Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
• Agent-based evolutionary game dynamics uncover the dual role of resource heterogeneity in the evolution of cooperation

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