Evolutionary stability in strategic models of single-locus frequency-dependent viability selection
The evolution of a single population can be modelled in the context of evolutionary game theory as well as by population genetic models. In the first case the fate of the population is determined by strategies and payoff matrices, in the latter case the evolutionary outcome is ruled by genotype-dependent and frequency-dependent fitness. In this paper the stability properties for both approaches are compared. For a given game theoretic population model the authors define a corresponding standard single-species model of frequency-dependent viability selection and introduce the concept of evolutionary stability in the genetic model. It is shown that an evolutionarily stable strategy in the game theoretic model is always evolutionary stable in the genetic model if there are at most three alleles. The proof of this result, which extends a similar result by \textit{Maynard Smith} [Am. Nat. 117, 1015-1018 (1981)] for two alleles, is quite complex and relies heavily on centre manifold analysis.
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- Evolutionary game dynamics
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